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Abstract: In this paper, we present a quantitative analysis of international capital flows in-
duced by differences in population aging processes across countries and by pension reforms.
In the vast majority of countries, demographic change will continue well into the 21st century.
It is well known that within each country, demographic change alters the time path of aggre-
gate savings, even more so in countries where fundamental pension reforms and shifts to-
wards more pre-funding are implemented. While the patterns of population aging are similar
in most countries, the timing differs substantially, in particular between industrialized and less
developed countries. To the extent that capital is internationally mobile, population aging will
therefore induce capital flows between countries. In order to quantify these effects, we de-
velop a stylized multi-country overlapping generations model, and we use long-term demo-
graphic projections for several world regions to simulate international capital flows over a 50
year horizon. Our simulations suggest that capital flows from fast-aging industrial countries
such as Germany to the rest of the world will be substantial. Closed-economy models of pen-
sion reform are likely to miss quantitatively important effects of international capital mobility.
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21. Introduction
In the vast majority of countries, populations are aging, and demographic change will con-
tinue well into the 21st century. While the patterns of population aging are similar in most
countries, the timing differs substantially, in particular between industrialized and less devel-
oped countries. It is well known that within each country, demographic change alters the time
path of aggregate savings, even more so in countries where fundamental pension reforms –
that is, a shift towards more pre-funding – are implemented. To the extent capital is interna-
tionally mobile, population aging will also induce capital flows between countries.
In this paper, we present a quantitative analysis of the capital flows induced by differential
aging processes across countries and by pension reforms. We develop a stylized multi-country
overlapping generations model which is, to our knowledge, new to the literature, and we use
long-term demographic projections for different sets of countries to project international
capital flows over a 50 year horizon. For tractability, we focus on Germany as a country with
one of the most severe aging problems in the world and a with public pay-as-you-go pension
system in deep need of reform (e.g., Birg and Börsch-Supan, 1999, Börsch-Supan, 2000). To
separate the direct effect of population aging on capital markets and the additional effects of a
fundamental pension reform towards a partially funded system, we present our projections for
both the (counterfactual) scenario of maintaining Germany’s current generous pension for-
ever, and under a fundamental pension reform as outlined by Börsch-Supan (2000).
Our simulations show that a transition to a partially funded system does not crowd out exist-
ing savings totally. The capital stock increases initially, but then decreases significantly when
the baby boom generations enter retirement. The corresponding decrease in the rate of return,
which results from both population aging and pre-funded pensions, is only modest, less than
one percentage point if we assume a closed economy. We continue to show that the return on
capital can be improved by international diversification, that is, by investing pension savings
in countries with a more favorable demographic transition path than Germany. The intuition
behind these findings is clear. If we allow for international capital mobility, the additional
saving induced by a transition to a partially funded pension system can be invested in other
countries with a more favorable age structure. This cannot make households worse off, and
we argue below that the welfare increases from investing pension savings internationally will
be substantial.
3These effects of international diversification on savings behavior and the implementation of
pension reforms receive rapidly increasing attention as the pension reform debate progresses.
Deardorff (1985) contains an early analysis, and Reisen (2000) provides a comprehensive
overview of these issues. Reisen argues strongly that there are pension-improving benefits of
global asset diversification. In a theoretical paper, Pemberton (1999) highlights the impor-
tance of international externalities caused by the effects of national pension and savings poli-
cies on the world interest rate. More recently, Pemberton (2000) goes a step further and shows
that – while the switch from a pay-as-you-go system to a fully funded pension system implies
that (at least) one generation necessarily loses – in a world where pension reform takes place
in many small, open economies, an intergenerational Pareto improvement is possible (for
some production technologies). Pemberton supports this finding by numerical simulations of a
stylized model for the OECD countries. However, the Pemberton’s extremely stylized over-
lapping generations model cannot account for realistic paths of demographic change within
different regions. Our model represents a significant improvement in this respect, and it al-
lows for realistic quantitative projections.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents some facts – empirical
evidence and theoretical explanations – for the effects of population aging on international
capital flows. In section 3, we present a stylized overlapping generations model that can be
used to evaluate these effects quantitatively. Section 4 contains our simulation results for dif-
ferent pension system and capital mobility scenarios. Section 5 concludes.
2. Some facts about population aging and international capital flows
At mid-1998, world population stood at 5.9 billion. While the world population has constantly
grown, its annual growth rate has decreased from 2.04 percent during the period from 1965 to
1970 to 1.33 percent between 1995 and 2000. It is expected that this decrease in world popu-
lation growth will continue. In the medium variant of the United Nations’ current world
population projections, the growth rate is projected to decrease to 0.3 percent by 2050. By
then, world population will have increased to 8.9 billion. 97 percent of this increase takes
place in less developed regions (United Nations, 1998).
These demographic changes are determined by a process called demographic transition (e.g.,
Birg, 1996). This process is determined by the non-coinciding dynamics of mortality and fer-
tility rates; it is most severe in the industrialized countries and in Asia. Three stages of the
demographic transition can be distinguished: First, mortality declines as a result of techno-
4logical progress and industrialization, second, and with a time lag, fertility rates also decline.
As a result, population growth slows down and a decreasing relative share of children faces an
increasing relative share of older persons. In the third stage, the speed of adjustment of both
rates slows down, and it is possible that the level of the fertility rates settles below the mortal-
ity rates. In this case, population growth becomes negative. In the long run, the age structure
of population is characterized by a relatively large share of older persons. Especially in in-
dustrialized countries, this process is exacerbated by the continuing increase in life expec-
tancy. Therefore, the relative share of old persons will not only be very high, but these per-
sons will also live longer.
Europe has almost passed the closing stages of the demographic transition process. It is now,
and is projected to remain, the geographic region that is most affected by aging. By 2005,
population growth is projected to be negative in Europe. The median age in Europe is pro-
jected to increase from 37.1 years in 1998 to about 47 years by 2050. The proportion of chil-
dren is projected to decline from 18 percent to 14 percent while the fraction of older persons
will increase from 20 percent to 35 percent by 2050. Other regions of the world that are sub-
stantially affected by aging are Northern America, Oceania, Asia, Latin America and the
Caribbean (United Nations, 1998).
While the patterns of population aging are similar in most countries, timing differs substan-
tially, in particular between industrialized and less developed countries. Asia and Latin
America are only at the beginning stages of the demographic transition. So far, characteristics
of a demographic transition process cannot be identified in Africa – fertility is at the highest
level worldwide, and even though child mortality is declining, life expectancy is still very low
(Bloom and Williamson, 1998). The impact of AIDS is devastating: in a group of 29 African
countries where the impact of AIDS has been studied by the United Nations, life expectancy
is projected to decrease by seven years in the near future (United Nations, 1998).
The impact of population aging can be expressed in the old-age dependency ratio, defined as
the ratio of the number of pensioners to the number of workers. In Germany, this ratio will in-
crease from about 60 percent in 2000 to 90 percent in 2050, according to Börsch-Supan and
Birg (1999).1 Analogous calculations for the rest the European Union show an increase in the
old-age dependency ratio from currently 45 percent to 60 percent in 2050 (Ludwig, 2001).
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 These projections are for a medium scenario of demographic change, characterized by modest aging, constant
fertility and a modest increase in labor force participation rates.
5The consequences of these increases are well-known and mirrored by the current debate on
privatizing social security (e.g., Börsch-Supan and Brugiavini, 2001).
From a macroeconomic point of view, population aging will change the balance between
capital and labor, in particular of industrialized countries. Labor supply will be scarce whereas
capital will be relatively abundant. This will drive up wages relative to the rate of return on
capital, reducing households’ incentive to save (if the interest elasticity of saving is positive).
In addition, some fraction of the capital stock may become obsolete due to the shrinking labor
force and diminishing returns to scale, making the accumulation of capital even less attractive.
Developing countries are less affected by this development since their population age struc-
ture is younger. These countries are better characterized by a relatively low supply of capital
and a relatively high supply of labor. As a result, the rate of return on capital is higher in de-
veloping countries. Capital exports to developing countries could therefore solve the aging
problems of industrialized countries by reducing the pressure on the interest rate and by
shifting the production of consumption goods towards developing countries.
More generally, differences in timing of demographic change across countries and regions in-
duce international capital flows, and there is some empirical evidence that this mechanism is
already at work (e.g., Higgins, 1998; Lührmann, 2001). Private net capital flows towards de-
veloping countries have increased remarkably during the past ten years. In 1996, the volume
of these flows was six times higher than at the beginning of the nineties. Private capital flows
make up for around 80 percent of total world capital flows and clearly dominate public capital
flows. 40 percent of private capital flows is foreign direct investment, another 40 percent is
portfolio investment and around 20 percent is banking credits (which are becoming less and
less important). Due to the increasing role of institutional investors such as pension funds, the
share of portfolio investment is likely to increase in future. Yet, international capital flows to
developing countries are highly geographically concentrated. Only twelve developing coun-
tries, among them China, Mexico and Brazil, absorb around 80 percent of private net capital
flows. The importance of private net capital flows is striking: in South East Asia and Latin
America, they account for around 5 percent of GNP (World Bank, 1997).
In a recent empirical study, Lührmann (2001) uses a broad panel of 141 countries that covers
the period 1960-95 to investigate the effects of demographics on national saving and capital
formation, and on international capital flows. She confirms that cross-country capital flows
are indeed influenced by demographic variables. While this has been shown in other studies
before, she can also show that across countries, relative differences in the age structure are the
6most important determinants of capital flows, a finding that is even more important for the
analysis of pension reform than the fact that the absolute age structure affects a country’s
capital balance. Moreover, as Lührmann (2001) shows, future changes in the age structure of
countries are important determinants of current savings and investment decisions, a finding
that confirms forward looking household behavior.
There are a number of theoretical arguments that establish a link between demographic
change and international capital flows (see Lührmann, 2001, for a review). The simulation
model we present in this paper builds on the well-known life-cycle theory of consumption and
savings by Modigliani, Ando and Brumberg (Modigliani and Brumberg, 1954; Ando and
Modigliani, 1963). The aggregation of individual, cohort-specific life-cycle savings profiles
leads to a decrease of national saving rates in an aging economy. Moreover, in a general equi-
librium model of forward looking individuals, it is not only the current demographic structure
that alters the time path of aggregate savings, but also future demographic developments. Em-
pirical evidence on how demographic change has affected savings behavior across countries
in the past is reviewed by Poterba (1998) and Brooks (2000).
In a general-equilibrium framework, there a are two main channels for effects of demographic
change on domestic capital formation. First, decreasing labor supply reduces demand for in-
vestment goods since less capital is needed. The magnitude of this effect depends on the elas-
ticity of substitution between the production factors capital and labor. Börsch-Supan (1995)
estimates a CES production function and concludes that the elasticity of substitution between
these two factors is close to one. This result indicates that production can be adjusted quite
flexibly which reduces the impact of demographic change on investment. Second, in a closed
economy, a decline in national saving leads to a decline in investment by definition. In an
open economy, the link between these two aggregates is broken to the extent that capital is
internationally mobile.
For quantitative projections of international capital flows induced by population aging, the
degree of capital mobility is a central question. This is essentially an empirical question, and
there has been no shortage of research on this isseue since the famous puzzle of Feldstein and
Horioka (1980).2 In their original contribution, Feldstein and Horioka have shown that na-
tional saving rates are highly correlated among OECD countries. While the coefficient has
fallen over time, it is still remarkably high. These findings have been interpreted as an indica-
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 See Obstfeld (1995), Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), and Coakley, Kulasi, and Smith (1998) for recent surveys.
7tion that capital is imperfectly mobile. However, this interpretation has later been criticized
both because there are a number of alternative explanations for the observed correlation (a re-
cent example is Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2000, who focus on transport costs for goods) and be-
cause of econometric problems associated with simply regressing national saving rates on
domestic investment rates (see for example Taylor, 1994).
Even if capital is fully mobile, this does not necessarily imply that households do actually di-
versify their portfolios optimally. There is a large empirical literature on ‘home bias’ in inter-
national portfolio choice (e.g., French and Poterba, 1991), and it is not yet fully understood
why households do not optimally diversify their portfolios across countries. A recent empiri-
cal study by Portes and Rey (1999) suggests that information asymmetries across countries
are a major source of home bias effects, and that capital flows are affected by both geographic
and informational proximity. Applied to pension reform policies, this literature suggests that
households might be more willing to invest their retirement savings in ‘similar’ countries such
as the OECD or EU countries than in, say, developing countries. Unfortunately, the latter are
the countries where not only the highest returns are to be found over much of the next cen-
tury, but which would also benefit themselves most from capital provided by the aging indus-
trialized nations. Blommestein (1998) and Holzmann (2000) discuss theses issues, both con-
cluding that investments in emerging markets can help to solve the OECD countries’ pension
crisis at the margin, but are unable to solve the demographic problem alone, and stressing that
additional reforms are needed. Our simulations will shed more light on the role of capital
flows to developing countries.
In most of our simulations, we assume that capital is freely mobile only within industrialized
countries. Approach This contrasts with Fougere and Merette (1999) and Miles (1999) who
state that modeling European countries as closed economies in general equilibrium models is
closer to reality than modeling them as open economies. Certainly, the truth is somewhere in
the middle, but we believe that allowing for free capital mobility in a multi-country model is a
better approximation to reality and warranted by the empirical evidence – at least when we re-
strict our model to perfect capital mobility in the OECD area.
3. Aging and pension reform in a stylized overlapping generations model
In this section, we present a dynamic macroeconomic model that allows us to analyze the ef-
fects of population aging and of a shift from a pay-as-you-go system to a (partially) funded
pension system. The model is based on a version of the overlapping generations model (Sa-
8muelson, 1958; Diamond, 1965) introduced by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987, chapter 3).
Overlapping generations models have been used extensively to study the effects of population
aging on social security systems, a purpose for which they are well suited since they are based
on households’ and firms’ optimal reactions to movements in the demographic structure and
public policy measures. Recent examples include Kotlikoff, Smetters and Walliser (1999) and
De Nardi et al. (1999) for the United States, Miles (1999) for Great Britain, and Fehr (2000)
and Börsch-Supan, Heiss and Winter (2000) for Germany. Miles and Iben (1999) present a
comparative analysis of pension reform schemes for the United Kingdom and Germany. Kot-
likoff (1998) provides an overview of earlier applications of overlapping generations models.
To our knowledge, the multi-country version of the Auerbach-Kotlikoff presented in this pa-
per model is new to the literature.3 Our model builds on a closed economy model for Ger-
many developed by Börsch-Supan, Heiss and Winter (2000). In particular, we extend their
model along three dimensions: (i) we consider several countries with differential aging proc-
esses and assume perfect capital mobility between different regions; (ii) we implement tech-
nological progress; and (iii) we explicitly model variations of the planning horizon of differ-
ent generations that are due to increasing life expectancy.4
Since the purpose of this paper is to study the macroeconomic effects of population aging and
of a fundamental pension reform, we restrict the analysis to a very stylized version of the
standard overlapping generations model that excludes many interesting aspects. However, we
take great care to get the first-order effects of demographic change right by using 75 cohorts
and annual demographic projections. In our simulations, we use two data sources for the
demographic projections: Birg and Börsch-Supan (1999) provide several demographic pro-
jections for Germany; we use the medium scenario (characterized by modest aging, constant
fertility and a modest increase in labor force participation rates). For the other world regions,
we use the medium variant of the United Nations’ World Development Prospects (United
Nations, 1998). Based on these demographic projections, we compute time paths for the num-
ber of workers and pensioners for each of the countries and world regions in our model. These
projections are described in detail by Ludwig (2000).
The most significant simplifications of our model relative to existing overlapping generations
models are as follows. (i) We do not explicitly consider taxes (other than the contributions to
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 A detailed description and analysis of the model presented in this paper can be found in Ludwig (2000).
4
 Börsch-Supan, Heiss and Winter (2000) made the simplifying assumption of a constant planning horizon and
implemented changes in life expectancy by weighting cohort sizes accordingly.
9the pay-as-you-go pension system). (ii) We do not include labor supply in the households’ de-
cision problem, but rather assume that all households supply one unit of labor until retire-
ment.5 (iii) We do not model intra-generational household heterogeneity and therefore cannot
capture distributional effects. (iv) We assume perfect foresight. (v) The only factors of pro-
duction are labor and real capital (i.e., we do not model human capital and therefore cannot
account for endogenous growth). While these issues surely are important, especially if one
wishes to analyze the effect of population aging on labor supply in the presence of distorting
taxes, we restrict our attention to households’ life-cycle savings decisions as their primary
means to prepare for demographic change and decreasing generosity of public pensions.
Despite these simplifications, our stylized model is sufficient to obtain the first-order effects
of population aging on domestic capital formation and international capital flows. To keep the
analysis tractable, our model focuses on Germany. We consider both the closed-economy case
and alternative open-economy scenarios; the latter are different with respect to the regions
within which capital can flow freely (within the EU, within the OECD, or the whole world).
In our simulations, the projected demographic transition for each country i enters via time-
specific sizes of the 75 living cohorts, denoted by aitN , , where a is age, exogenously given at
every point in time, t. The economic life of a cohort begins at the age of twenty years, for
which we set a = 1. For ease of presentation, we take aitN ,  to be number of workers, 
a
itL , , for a
= 1, ..., 39, and the number of retired persons, aitZ , , for a = 40, ..., 75. This implies that there is
a fixed retirement age of 60 at which everybody stops to work, stops to pay pension taxes, and
begins to collect pension benefits from the pay-as-you-go system. In our actual simulations,
the retirement pattern is much more flexible: We include an age and time-specific weight that
represents the fraction of the population that is retired, and this fraction increases from 0 to 1
over an extended retirement window from age 47 through 80. The time paths of these weights
are cohort-specific, reflecting shifts in labor supply and retirement behavior. Also, the upper
age of a = 75 is only chosen for ease of presentation. As noted before, in our actual calcula-
tions, the time horizon of each cohort is constrained by its life expectancy. Our weighting ap-
proach matches individual decisions to the demographic projections.
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 However, we account for unemployment and labor force participation decisions since the aggregate workforce
is adjusted according to the labor market scenarios behind the demographic projections in Birg and Börsch-
Supan (1999).
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The current pension system of each region i enters the model through fixed time paths of the
contribution rate, τt,i. The contribution rate is calculated from an exogenously given time spe-
cific replacement rate, Rt,i, defined as the ratio of the average net pension and the average net
wage wt,i at time t. Thus, the budget of the public pension system is balanced at any time t:
(1) ititititititit ZwRLw ,,,,,,, )1( ττ −= .
As a pension reform scheme for Germany, we use the ‘freezing’ reform proposal by Birg and
Börsch-Supan (1999) and Börsch-Supan (2000b), but we should point out that the same
mechanisms are at work in any scheme that involves the introduction of a funded component.
The ‘freezing’ reform scheme assumes that the contribution rate to the pay-as-you-go pension
system remains fixed – for Germany, at its current level of 21 percent. More specifically, we
assume that the pension reform is publicly announced in the year 2001, and implemented by
fixing the contribution rate in 2006. Thus, households that started their economic live before
2001 have a period of five years to adopt their life-time plans, while households that enter
economic live after 2001 already face the new conditions. Since the pay-as-you-go pension
system remains in place, the freezing of contribution rates results in lower public pension
payments, given a rising old-age dependency ratio. This, in turn, results in lower replacement
rates provided by the pay-as-you-go pillar of the pension system.
In our simulations, we calculate the time path of the replacement rate which determines public
pension payments endogenously from equation (1). The per-capita pension at time t is thus
given by the product of the replacement rate and the net wage,
(2) )1(
,,,, itititit wRP τ−⋅= .
We do not explicitly model the funded component of the pension system. In our model, the
funded component consists entirely of voluntary, private savings, as given by households’
optimal life-cycle decisions.
General equilibrium in this overlapping generations is constructed via the production sector
where, given factor inputs (capital and labor), output and factor prices are determined. The
production sector in each country consists of a representative firm that uses a CES production
function given by
(3) ( ) ( ) βββ αα /11 1/11
,,
/11
,,,,,
))(1(, −−− −+== ititititititit LAKLAKFY ,
where α
 
and β
 
are the factor share and the elasticity of substitution, respectively (which are
assumed identical for all countries). Kt,i denotes the capital stock of country i and time t and
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At,i is labor productivity, while At+1,i = At,i(1+g). We assume that the growth rate of labor pro-
ductivity is also constant for all countries and across time.6 We divide equation (3) by At,iLt,i
to obtain the representation of the production function in terms of  efficiency units,
(4) ( ) ( ) ββ αα /11 1/11
,,,
)1( −− −+== ititit kkfy ,
where yt,i is output and kt,i is the capital stock per efficiency unit of labor of country i.
From static profit maximization, we obtain the interest rate which is identical for all countries
due to our assumption of perfect capital mobility. It follows that the capital stock per effi-
ciency unit is also equal for all countries,
(5) ( ) ikkikfr tititt ∀=⇔∀−′=             ,, δ ,
where δ  is the rate of depreciation of capital, assumed to be constant across time and identical
for all countries. f’(kt,i) is the first derivative of equation (4) with respect to capital. It follows
that output per efficiency unit is also identical for all countries, i.e. yt,i=yt ∀ i. Accordingly,
the wage rate is given by
(6) ( ))()(
,,, tttittitit kfkkfAAw ′−== ω ,
where • t is the world wage rate per efficiency unit. Since efficiency might differ across
countries, nominal wages can of course be different across countries.
In order to determine aggregate consumption, we next consider optimal household behavior
derived from intertemporal utility maximization. By choosing an optimal consumption path,
each generation a maximizes, at any point in time t, the sum of discounted future utility. We
assume that preferences are identical for all countries. The within-period utility function ex-
hibits constant relative risk aversion, and preferences are additive and separable over time.
The target function of generation a’s maximization problem at time t is given by
(7) ( ) ( )∑=
−
−+
−
+−
=
iLE
aj
j
iajtaj
a
it CU
, 1
,, 1
1
1
1 κ σ
ρσ
,
where σ denotes the coefficient of relative risk aversion, ρ is the discount rate and LE• ,i is the
life expectancy of cohort •  born in year t = • +a. Maximization is subject to a dynamic
budget constraint which for generation a at time t is given by
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 This implies that we abstract from any direct impact of demographic change on productivity; see Cutler et al.
(1990) for a discussion.
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Here, aitM ,  is the life-time budget surplus, set to zero since we exclude bequests from our
analysis, and aitW ,  is total wealth, both specific to generation a at time t.7 The solution to the
intertemporal optimization problem can be characterized by an Euler equation,
(9)
σ
ρ
/1
1
,1, 1
1




+
+
=
−+
−
−−+−+
ajtj
iajt
j
iajt
r
CC ,
which reflects households’ trade-off between current and future utility. As in any life-cycle
model, this trade-off is determined by the ratio of the interest rate and the time preference
rate, and by the degree of risk aversion.
Since factor prices (i.e., wage and interest rates) and both contribution rates to, and replace-
ment rates of, the pay-as-you-go pension system are known, we can now determine the life-
time consumption paths of all generations backwards, starting with zero wealth in the final pe-
riod of life, and then iterating using the Euler equation and the budget constraint. The result-
ing time paths of consumption determine aggregate saving and wealth in the household sector
for each country i:
(10) ∑
=
=
75
1
,,,
a
a
it
a
itit NWW ,
while 1
,1
1
,1,
−
−
−
−
+= a it
a
it
a
it SWW and S is savings. This yields total world wealth holdings as the sum
of the wealth of all regions, which in turn is equal to the world capital stock,
(11) ∑
=
==
R
i
ittt WWK
1
,
,
where R is the number of regions considered. From equation (4), the capital stock of each
country is determined as
(11) itittit LAkK ,,, = .
Domestic investment in period t is the difference between the capital stock of each country in
period t and period t-1 plus depreciation:
13
(12) ititit KKI ,,1, )1( δ−−= + ,
The difference between total wealth of a country Wt,i and its capital stock Kt,i is foreign assets,
denoted as Bt,i. Equilibrium of the model therefore requires that the sum of all foreign assets
across all regions is zero:
(13) 0
1
,
=∑
=
R
i
itB .
The current account surplus, CAt,i of country i at time t is the difference between foreign as-
sets at times t and t-1. Together with equation (12) this also determines aggregate savings,
(14) itititititititit ICASISBBCA ,,,,,,,1,       )1( +=⇔−=−−= + δ .
Aggregate consumption is determined by taking the difference between the gross national
product of country i and savings,
(15) itittitit SBrYC ,,,, −+= .
Note that we assume that labor is not mobile, and therefore the only income from abroad is
asset income. Finally, note that we could alternatively aggregate over individual consumption
and savings across cohorts for each country, but our approach turned out to be more robust
against aggregation errors.
An equilibrium path of this overlapping generations model can be determined using a recur-
sive numerical procedure, known as the Gauss-Seidel-Algorithm (see Auerbach and Kot-
likoff, 1987). The solution algorithm starts with picking an arbitrary initial time path for the
world capital stock per efficiency unit, kt. Since labor supply is exogenous in our model, we
can readily solve the static optimization problem of the representative firm for a given trial
value of the world capital stock kt and the labor inputs implied by the demographic projec-
tions. We can then compute time paths of the factor prices (i.e., the wage and interest rates).
Given factor prices, we can solve the age and time-specific intertemporal optimization prob-
lems of all cohorts at all points in time, which yields, after aggregating across agents and
countries, time paths of aggregate world asset holdings, which is just equal to the world capi-
tal stock. We use equations (10) and (11) to determine the new world capital stock per effi-
ciency unit:
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 Our actual simulations are more complicated. The budget constraint (8) is based on a fixed retirement age for
the sake of simplified notation, but as noted before, we allow for a flexible retirement window so that in our
simulations, the budget constraint must include the appropriate weights.
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This new capital stock is consistent with household optimization (conditional on factor prices)
but will not necessarily coincide with the trial time-path that we specified initially. So we
need to change the initial capital stock and repeat the entire computation recursively until
convergence with respect to the time path of the capital stock is achieved, and an intertempo-
ral equilibrium of the dynamic economy is found.
The parameter values used in the calibration of our model are standard in the literature on
simulated overlapping generations models; they are summarized in table 1. We use GDP data
for all countries to calibrate the technology parameter At,i in the base year of our calculations.
As noted before, At,i then continues to grow at a constant rate g. This implies that the initial
weight of each country in our simulations is determined by its relative share in current world
GDP.
4. Simulation results for alternative pension and capital mobility scenarios
We now present the results of our macroeconomic simulation model. Our focus is mostly on
the impact of population aging on the German economy. To separate the direct effects of
population aging and the additional effects of a fundamental pension reform, we always pres-
ent two scenarios, the current pay-as-you-go system and a fundamental pension reform. These
are two extreme cases, and they are both counterfactual: The current system is politically un-
sustainable and cannot survive, while the German pension reform that was passed in February
2001 is by no means as fundamental as the one we consider in our simulations. So the most
likely scenario for Germany’s future pension system is somewhere between our extreme sce-
narios. However, by comparing two polar scenarios, we can show that a good portion of  the
capital market effects of population aging arise even without a fundamental pension reform.
In addition to our pension reform scenarios, we consider three alternative capital mobility
scenarios: investment only within Germany (the closed-economy case), investment in the EU
countries, and investment in the OECD countries. There are two reasons for choosing these
rather modest capital mobility scenarios: first, as already noted in section 2, there is a broad
consensus that capital is quite mobile among OECD countries while this is much less clear for
developing countries. Second, as we will show below, beneficial effects of capital mobility do
already show up when capital is freely mobile among countries of the European Union, and
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including more countries does not change our results substantially. Finally, while we initially
assume that a fundamental pension reform is implemented only in Germany, we end this sec-
tion with a brief analysis of simultaneous pension reforms in other countries of the world.
We begin with looking at aggregate savings rates. Figure 1 shows that projected aggregate
savings rates under a fundamental pension reform would be substantially higher than under
the present system. For example, in the year 2035, when the peak of the aging problem oc-
curs, savings rates are projected to be very low under the current pay-as-you-go system. De-
pending on the capital mobility scenario, the aggregate savings rate declines from currently
around 12.1 percent (1998) to between 8.1 and 8.6 percent. This is the pure effect of popula-
tion aging in the current system. In contrast, under a fundamental pension reform, the aggre-
gate saving rate settles at around 9.3 percent under the assumption of perfect capital mobility
within the EU. These projections show that optimal life-cycle behavior generates additional
saving under a fundamental pension reform – in our model, it is not the case that additional
retirement saving induced by a pension reform crowds out other saving totally, as often
claimed. Our projections indicate a substitution of about one third, leaving two thirds to new
saving. Note that all variations of the aggregate saving rate shown in Figure 1 are in the range
of historical variations in German saving rates.
Figure 1b also shows the discrete adjustments that occur when a pension reform is announced
or implemented. The first jump occurs in 2002, one year after the announcement of the pen-
sion reform, the second in 2007, one year after the reform itself. This latter jump goes up, as
expected, since the pension reform induces additional private savings. But with the same rea-
soning the first jump should also go up. The downward jump is therefore – at first sight –
counterintuitive. The reason for this downward jump is that we aggregate across households
which react very differently to the announcement of a fundamental pension reform. Such a re-
form induces additional retirement savings for all households. But contrary to older house-
holds, young households have the prospect of higher net wages after the reform is imple-
mented. This future income effect dominates, and younger households therefore decrease
savings during the period from 2002 to 2006. In aggregation, the weight of these young
households is higher than the weight of older households which have less time to exploit
higher net wages, or are already dissaving.
This argument also explains the difference in the magnitudes of the jumps under alternative
capital mobility scenarios. The increase in aggregate income is higher when the capital mo-
bility region is larger. Therefore, the downward jump in the aggregate saving rate is slightly
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higher if capital is freely mobile within the OECD (-0.43 percentage points) than if Germany
is assumed to be a closed economy (-0.39 percentage points). Accordingly, the upward jump
after the reform is lower in the OECD scenario (+0.19 percentage points) than in the closed-
economy scenario (+0.22 percentage points).
Next, we aggregate savings to obtain a Germany’s foreign position and capital stock. Figure
2a shows projections of the total capital stock under the current pension system. A first obser-
vation is that movements in the aggregate capital stock are by far less pronounced in the open
economy. These movements are caused by the alternating dominance of demographic effects
and of growth in labour productivity. The economy gradually accumulates capital until the
peak of the aging process is reached in 2030. After 2030, when the aging process has almost
reached its peak, the capital stock decreases if Germany is assumed to be a closed economy.
In the open economy case, the growth of the capital stock almost disappears, but the growth
rate never becomes negative. In the open economy scenarios, the German capital stock in-
creases to about 140 or 144 percent of its current value if capital is freely mobile within the
EU or within the OECD, respectively, and to 138 percent if Germany is assumed to be a
closed economy. Under a fundamental pension reform, the decrease in the capital stock in the
closed economy scenario, caused by aging, is less pronounced since more capital is accumu-
lated as a result of the pension reform (figure 2b). The increase of the aggregate capital stock
is now higher than in both open economy scenarios. This result confirms that under a pension
reform, relatively more capital is invested abroad.
The effect of aging on German capital exports is shown in figure 3. Under the current pension
system, foreign asset holdings of German households first increase and then, after a peak is
reached in 2030, decrease again to about their current levels. The decrease in foreign asset
holdings is less pronounced under a fundamental pension reform. Until 2050, German foreign
asset holdings are projected to about double. The net capital flows from Germany to other re-
gions are shown, as a percentage of GNP, in figure 4. When the aging process peaks, Ger-
many almost becomes a net capital importer in 2038, besides the more attractive investment
opportunities abroad, since the saving rate is at its bottom.
Next, we take a closer look at net capital flows in the OECD scenario. Figure 5 shows net
capital exports of different regions within the OECD, as a percentage of total capital flows.
The region named “OECD 12” includes all OECD countries except for Japan, the United
States and the countries of the European Union. Like Germany, Japan is projected to be a net
capital exporter due to the effects of aging. In Japan, the ratio of the number of persons aged
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over 65 and the number of workers is expected to increase from currently slightly above 20
percent to more than 50 percent by 2050. At the same time, Japan has implemented a social
security reform program, that, among other things, intends to increase retirement age by five
years by the year 2050. We implement this reform program in our simulations and thus the
increase of the old-age dependency ratio is by far less pronounced than the direct effect of
population aging. Therefore, our model predicts decreasing net capital exports of Japan.
Figure 5 also shows that the main capital import region is Europe except Germany, denoted as
“EU 14”. We further assume that the net exports of country i to country j are equal to the
product of the export share of a country i, expressed as net capital exports as a percentage of
total ‘world’ exports, and net imports of country j. This assumption is consistent with our
model, since households are indifferent between regions with respect to their portfolio choice.
Under this assumption, the region EU 14 absorbs about 60 percent of total German exports
until 2025. Then, the United States becomes the most important import destination of German
capital exports. In 2030, the US itself imports around 60 percent of total German exports. Af-
ter 2038, the region EU 14 again takes over this position. The United States is less affected by
the aging process than are Germany and Japan. As for Japan, we implement reform proposals
aimed to increase retirement age by 2 years in our simulations. Therefore, the United States is
a capital importer initially but takes over the role of a capital exporter when Japan becomes an
import country due to the reform proposal. As Figure 5b indicates, a fundamental pension re-
form in Germany would lead to an enormous increase in Germany’s export share. By 2050, it
is projected to have increased from 9 percent to 30 percent, at the expense of the export shares
of all other countries.
Next, we show the effects of population aging on the return on capital. As can be seen from
figure 6a, the return on capital in the closed economy scenario decreases by 0.5 percentage
points between the years 2012 and 2026 – this is the direct effect caused by aging. This de-
crease is only around 0.3 percentage points when capital is freely mobile within the European
Union, and only 0.1 percentage points in the OECD scenario. A fundamental pension reform
leads to an additional reduction in the rate of return on capital, caused by the increasing sup-
ply of capital and diminishing returns. In the closed economy scenario, the rate of return is re-
duced by 0.5 percentage points in 2050 relative to the rate of return under current pension
system. This decrease is much less than often claimed in the public debate, and similar in
magnitude to earlier findings in the closed-economy model by Börsch-Supan, Heiss and
Winter (2000). Moreover, the decrease in the rate of return on capital reduces to only 0.12
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percentage points if capital is freely mobile within the EU. In the OECD scenario, the yield
difference almost disappears.
These results suggests that household savings induced by a fundamental pension reform
should be invested internationally, not only for reasons of risk diversification (which are of
course not present in our deterministic model), but also for the sake of higher returns that are
available in other countries with different aging processes and more favorable capital/labor
ratios. Our results also confirm our earlier claim that the most important beneficial effects of
capital mobility do already show up under very modest capital mobility scenarios. Indeed,
there is virtually no difference between the OECD scenario and a scenario where we allow for
perfect capital mobility in the entire world, as can be seen from figure 7 where we include the
entire world as a forth capital mobility scenario for the first time.
The final step of our analysis focuses on welfare aspects of population aging, pension reform,
and capital mobility. We consider two measures of welfare, aggregate consumption and dis-
counted life-time utility of individual cohorts. For ease of presentation, we restrict the analysis
to a comparison between the closed economy scenario and free capital mobility among the
OECD countries. Figure 8a shows that aggregate consumption in the open economy scenario
exceeds aggregate consumption in the closed economy scenario from the year 2030 on. These
differences in aggregate consumption are higher under a fundamental pension reform scheme
(figure 8b). Moreover, in the long run, consumption gains due to fundamental pension reform
are higher in the open economy case.
Aggregate consumption captures welfare aspects only partially, since population aging and a
fundamental pension reform affect generations differently. We therefore turn to a cohort-
specific measure of welfare, discounted life-time utility. Figure 9 shows, by birth year,
changes in total life-time utility induced by a fundamental pension reform. These projections
use the preference structure outlined in the previous section. Some generations (mainly those
who are currently working and still some years away from retirement) experience utility
losses, while the younger and yet unborn generations benefit. The comparison between the
two different capital mobility scenarios yields interesting and important results. First, utility
losses induced by a fundamental pension reform are smaller in the open economy scenario,
and less generations are affected. Second, utility gains are smaller in the open economy sce-
nario – despite the fact that aggregate consumption increases are higher.
In our simulations, the change in life-time utility induced by a fundamental pension reform is
negative for all generations born between 1929 and 1960 in the closed economy. If capital is
19
freely mobile within the OECD, two generations (born 1959 and 1969) become net winners.
Generations experience welfare losses for two reasons under the fundamental pension reform.
First, transfers of the public pension system are reduced and therefore savings must be in-
creased which crowds out consumption. Second, the decrease in rate of return on capital af-
fects those generations that have already accumulated a large stock of assets relatively more,
namely the older generations. In the open economy, the decrease in the rate of return on capi-
tal is smaller and therefore the utility losses are also smaller. This confirms that closed econ-
omy models overestimate the transitional burden of pension reform.
The underlying problem for this transitional burden is well known: Since at the time of the
introduction of a pay-as-you-go system, at least one generation received pension benefits
without contributing to the system, the system carries an implicit debt that is rolled over from
one generation to the next. Reducing or abolishing the pay-as-you-go systems requires that
this debt be paid back, so at least one generation is worse off. This raises political economy
issues: It is obvious that when a Pareto criterion is applied, a pension reform which reduces or
even abolishes the a pay-as-you-go pension system is politically not feasible.8
This is, however, not the full story, and a fundamental pension reform is possible for several
reasons. First, a pension reform induces efficiency gains which, over long horizons, might be
large enough to compensate the pay-as-you-go system’s implicit debt. In our framework, such
efficiency gains could translate into a rate of return that is higher than under a pure pay-as-
you-go system. An increased efficiency of international capital markets and corporate govern-
ance effects are possible mechanisms as discussed in Börsch-Supan, Heiss and Winter (2000)
and Börsch-Supan and Winter (2001). Efficiency gains might also arise on labor markets from
changes in tax-induced incentive effects (e.g., Fenge, 1995). Second, if a Pareto improvement
is not required and a majority vote is assumed instead, feasible transition policies might exist
(see Hirte, 2000, for a simulation analysis using a median-voter framework for Germany).
In both cases, it is crucial that a fundamental pension reform distributes the transition burden
across generations, shifting at least some of the cost to unborn generations. In practice, this
could be achieved by temporary debt financing of benefits. Cooley and Soares (1999) show
that, in the absence of efficiency effects, all politically feasible transition policies use debt to
finance benefits during the transition period; Feldstein and Samwick (1998, 2000) provide
                                               
8
 We do not attempt to review the theoretical literature on political feasibility of pension reforms here. See, e.g.,
Fenge (1995) and the review in Hirte (2000).
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calculations of how debt finance is used in their framework for Social Security reform in the
United States.
Even without debt finance, the transition burden can be distributed across generations such
that a reform is politically feasible − provided that some generations are willing to accept
small losses relative to the status quo. The simulations depicted in figure 9 suggest that even
those generations which are hit hardest only suffer decreases of less than 1 percent in total
life-time utility. The increase in life-time utility for younger generations is striking, and this
suggests that even a modest degree of altruism (and less in the open economy) among cur-
rently working generations might make a fundamental pension reform politically feasible. Re-
cent polls by Boeri et al. (2001) suggest that this assumption is indeed warranted in Ger-
many.9
So far, our analysis was focused on the effects of pension reform for German households.
Now, we analyze the implications of a pension reform in Germany for foreign households.
Households in other countries are affected by a fundamental pension reform because of
changes in relative prices. The rate of return on capital decreases relative to the labor income,
and capital income is reduced by the increase of German assets. In the long run, households
benefit from the increased income generated by the higher world capital stock, while in the
short run those generations lose for whom the decrease of the rate of return on capital has the
strongest effects (figure 10). This contrasts with a finding of Bräuninger (1999) who analyzes
a simple two-period model. In his model, the young generation of a country where no pension
reform takes place do not experience any utility losses. Our model shows that two-period
models cannot fully capture the dynamic effects of population aging, pension reform, and
capital mobility. From figure 10b, one can see that the utility gains and losses in other Euro-
pean countries are much smaller when capital is perfectly mobile within the OECD, because
then the additional savings of German households are invested more broadly. Also, utility
gains and losses are much smaller in foreign countries than in Germany.
We conclude this section with a brief discussion of the effects of simultaneous pension re-
forms in several countries. We constrain the analysis to the effects of stylized pension reforms
in other countries of the European Union. For simplicity, we assume that all pension systems
are simultaneously reformed in the same manner, by freezing contribution rates to the public
                                               
9
 While we do not allow for bequests in our stylized model, we should note that a pension reform is likely to re-
sult in variations in bequests, in particular in the absence of mandated intergenerational transfers. Based on an
overlapping generations model, Miles and Iben (1999) provide estimates of such changes in bequests.
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pay-as-you-go pension system, as in the reform scenario for Germany. We further assume that
capital is perfectly mobile within the European Union. Here, we concentrate on the effects on
the rate of return on capital. Recall that when Germany was assumed to be the only country
that implements a pension reform, the rate of return on capital decreased by 0.12 percentage
points in the EU scenario. As can be seen from figure 11, the decrease in the rate of return on
capital is slightly larger in magnitude (0.2 percentage points) when all European economies
simultaneously reform their pension systems. This effect is small, and we therefore conclude
that the international capital market is strong enough to absorb additional capital that is gener-
ated by pension reforms throughout the world, the main reason for this strength being differ-
ences in the timing of population aging across countries.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we have analyzed the consequences of population aging and a fundamental pen-
sion reform – that is, a shift towards more pre-funding – for capital markets in Germany and
for international capital flows. We developed a stylized overlapping generations model to
predict capital formation and movements over a long horizon, taking demographic projections
as given. Our results confirm that population aging results, at least initially, in a higher capital
stock, but when the baby boom generations begin to consume their retirement savings, the
capital stock will decrease after 2030. This effect is exacerbated by a fundamental pension re-
form. Our simulations suggest that the decrease in the rate of return on capital, which results
from secular shifts in the capital-labor ratio associated with an aging population and retire-
ment saving, is less than one percentage point, and only if pension funds invest exclusively in
Germany. However, capital markets these days are anything but closed national markets, and
the return on capital can be improved by international diversification.
While all OECD countries are affected by aging, there are important differences in the timing
of these demographic effects as well as the bulk of the aging process. These differences gen-
erates capital flows, as capital moves towards countries with a more favorable capital/labor
ratio. Our simulations suggest that international diversification (i.e., allowing for investment
in all EU and OECD countries) can reduce the decline of the rate of return on capital to just
about 0.5 percentage points around the year 2035, when baby boomers’ dissaving is most
pronounced. If investment is allowed also in developing countries, this effect would initially
be about the same, but over very long horizons, when countries such as China and India reach
the peak level of demand for capital on world markets, the rate of return would increase fur-
ther.
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A few remarks on the economic model we used to simulate the macroeconomic effects of a
fundamental pension reform are in order. We have already mentioned that our overlapping-
generations model is very stylized and some important economic mechanisms are not taken
into account, most importantly, endogenous labor supply decisions and taxation. While it
would certainly be interesting to explore these issues in our model, we do not anticipate that
they would change the basic message of our analysis.
An important aspect which is not reflected by the overlapping generations model of sections 3
and 4 is financial markets risk. Our analysis concentrated on the long-term path of the rate of
return on capital in a model with no stochastic aggregate fluctuations, so there was no role for
risk. However, real-world investments are risky, and in their savings and portfolio decisions,
households are concerned not only about the (expected) rate of return, but also about its vari-
ance, that is, about portfolio risk. This raises the question whether countries such as Germany
are really willing to invest substantial fractions of their retirement wealth abroad. More re-
search on this issue is certainly warranted, but our simulations suggest that significant positive
effects of capital mobility arise even if capital flows are restricted to Europe or the OECD,
and this does not appear to be an unrealistic scenario.
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Figure 1: Projections of the German aggregate saving rate under alternative pension systems and capital mobility scenarios
Figure 1a: Current pension systems Figure 1b: Fundamental pension reform
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Notes: This figure shows projections of the aggregate savings of German households as a percentage of GNP. Pension reform only in Germany.
Germany: Germany as a closed economy, EU: perfect capital mobility in the EU area, OECD: perfect capital mobility in the OECD area.
Source: Own calculations, based on demographic projections by Birg and Börsch-Supan (1999) and the United Nations (1998).
Figure 2: Projections of the aggregate German capital stock under alternative pension systems and capital mobility scenarios (Index, 2000=100)
Figure 2a: Current pension systems Figure 2b: Fundamental pension reform
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Notes: This figure shows projections of the aggregate German Capital stock. Pension reform only in Germany.
Germany: Germany as a closed economy, EU: perfect capital mobility in the EU area, OECD: perfect capital mobility in the OECD area.
Source: Own calculations, based on demographic projections by Birg and Börsch-Supan (1999) and the United Nations (1998).
Figure 3: Projections of aggregate German foreign assets under alternative pension systems and capital mobility scenarios (Index, 2000=100)
Figure 3a: Current pension systems Figure 3b: Fundamental pension reform
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Notes: This figure shows projections of aggregate German foreign assets. Pension reform only in Germany.
Germany: Germany as a closed economy, EU: perfect capital mobility in the EU area, OECD: perfect capital mobility in the OECD area.
Source: Own calculations, based on demographic projections by Birg and Börsch-Supan (1999) and the United Nations (1998).
Figure 4: Projections of German net capital exports under alternative pension systems and capital mobility scenarios
Figure 4a: Current pension systems Figure 4b: Fundamental pension reform
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Notes: This figure shows projections of German net capital exports as a percentage of German GNP towards the EU and the OECD, respectively.
Pension reform only in Germany.
EU: Net German capital exports to the other countries of the European Union when there is capital mobility only within the European Union,
OECD: Net German capital exports to the other countries of the OECD when there is capital mobility only within the OECD.
Source: Own calculations, based on demographic projections by Birg and Börsch-Supan (1999) and the United Nations (1998).
Figure 5: Projections of net capital exports of the OECD area under the assumption of perfect capital mobility within the OECD
Figure 5a: Current pension systems Figure 5b: Fundamental pension reform
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Notes: This figure shows projections of net capital exports of the respective region as a percentage of total capital flows under the assumption of
perfect capital mobility within the OECD. Pension reform only in Germany.
EU 14: All countries of the European Union except Germany.
OECD 12: All OECD countries except for the countries of the European Union, Japan and the United States.
Source: Own calculations, based on demographic projections by Birg and Börsch-Supan (1999) and the United Nations (1998).
Figure 6: Projections of the rate of return on capital under alternative pension systems and capital mobility scenarios
Figure 6a: Current pension systems Figure 6b: Fundamental pension reform
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Notes: This figure shows projections of the rate of return on capital. Pension reform only in Germany.
Germany: Germany as a closed economy, EU: perfect capital mobility in the EU area, OECD: perfect capital mobility in the OECD area.
Source: Own calculations, based on demographic projections by Birg and Börsch-Supan (1999) and the United Nations (1998).
Figure 7: Comparison of the projections of the rate of return on capital with a worldwide capital mobility scenario
Figure 7a: Current pension systems Figure 7b: Fundamental pension reform
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Notes: This figure shows projections of the rate of return on capital. Pension reform only in Germany.
Germany: Germany as a closed economy, EU: perfect capital mobility in the EU area, OECD: perfect capital mobility in the OECD area, World:
perfect capital mobility in the entire world.
Source: Own calculations, based on demographic projections by Birg and Börsch-Supan (1999) and the United Nations (1998).
Figure 8: Projections of aggregate consumption of German households under alternative pension systems and capital mobility scenarios
Figure 8a: Current pension systems Figure 8b: Fundamental pension reform
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Notes: This figure shows projections of aggregate consumption of German households. Pension reform only in Germany.
Germany: Germany as a closed economy, OECD: perfect capital mobility in the OECD area.
Source: Own calculations, based on demographic projections by Birg and Börsch-Supan (1999) and the United Nations (1998).
Figure 9: Changes in discounted life-time utility of German households induced by a fundamental pension reform
Figure 9a: Cohorts born between 1925 and 2050 Figure 9b: Cohorts born between 1925 and 1970
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
1925 1950 1975 2000 2025 2050
cohort's year of birth
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
l
i
f
e
-
t
i
m
e
 
u
t
i
l
i
t
y
 
[
%
]
Germany
OECD
-1.0%
-0.5%
0.0%
0.5%
1.0%
1.5%
1925 1940 1955 1970
cohort's year of birth
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
l
i
f
e
-
t
i
m
e
 
u
t
i
l
i
t
y
 
[
%
] OECD
Germany
Notes: This figure shows percentage changes in discounted life-time utility of German households by cohorts’ year of birth. Pension reform only in
Germany.
Germany: Germany as a closed economy, OECD: perfect capital mobility in the OECD area.
Source: Own calculations, based on demographic projections by Birg and Börsch-Supan (1999) and the United Nations (1998).
Figure 10: Changes in discounted life-time utility of households in the EU 14 area (without Germany) induced by a fundamental German pension
reform
Figure 10a: Cohorts born between 1925 and 2050 Figure 10b: Cohorts born between 1925 and 2000
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Notes: This figure shows percentage changes in discounted life-time utility of households of the European Union by the cohort’s year of birth.
Pension reform only in Germany.
EU: perfect capital mobility in the EU area, OECD: perfect capital mobility in the OECD area.
Source: Own calculations, based on demographic projections by Birg and Börsch-Supan (1999) and the United Nations (1998).
Figure 11: Projections of the rate of return on capital under alternative pension system
scenarios and perfect capital mobility in the EU
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Notes: This figure shows projections of the rate of return on capital. Pension reform in
Germany or simultaneous pension reforms in all other countries of the European Union,
respectively. Perfect capital mobility in the EU.
Current Systems: current PAYG pension systems, Reform in Germany: pension reform only
in Germany, Reform in EU: simultaneous pension reforms in the entire EU.
Source: Own calculations, based on demographic projections by Birg and Börsch-Supan
(1999) and the United Nations (1998).
Table 1: Calibration of parameters in the overlapping generations model
α: output share of capital in the CES production function 0,4099
β: elasticity of substitution in the CES production function 0,9990
g: rate of technological progress 0,014
δ: depreciation rate of capital 0,05
ρ: rate of time preference 0,08
σ: elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption 3
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